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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
Case No. 950277-CA

v.

:

BRET RAY ARBON,

:

and

:

KIMBERLY SUE MILLIGAN,

:

Priority No. 10

Defendants/Appellants.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendants appeal from interlocutory orders denying
their motions to dismiss their criminal prosecutions on double
jeopardy grounds.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the cases

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1994).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Does the administrative revocation of a driver's

license constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes?
The trial court's determination that an administrative
driver's license revocation does not amount to a criminal
punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause is a conclusion of
law that is reviewed for correctness.

Cf. United States v.

Rogers, 960 F.2d 1501, 1506 (10th Cir. 1992) ("We review de novo
the legal conclusions made by the district court regarding double
jeopardy claims.").

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
U. S. Const. Amend. V:
No person shall be held to answer for a
capitol, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.
The text of any other pertinent provisions, statutes or
rules is incorporated in the argument section of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendants were arrested for driving while under the
influence of alcohol and had their driver's licenses revoked
administratively (Record of State v. Arbon at 4, 20 [hereinafter
"Rl."]; record of State v. Milliaan at 3, 15 [hereinafter
"R2."]).

Upon being charged in criminal court with driving while

under the influence of alcohol, defendants filed motions to
dismiss their prosecution on double jeopardy grounds (Rl. at 1929; R2. at 15-25).

Specifically, defendants claimed that the

administrative revocation of their driving privileges constituted
a punishment and that a criminal prosecution for DUI would
subject them to a second punishment for the same offense (id.).
The trial court denied defendants' motions without comment (Rl.
53-54; R2. 48-49).

(Copies of the trial court's orders are

attached hereto as addendum A.)
2

Defendants petitioned this Court for permission to
appeal from the trial court's interlocutory orders, and the State
recommended that the petitions be granted (Rl. at 126). This
Court granted defendants' petitions and ordered the cases
consolidated on appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts underlying the charges against defendants are
not apparent from the records on appeal. However, because the
issue raised on appeal is purely a matter of law that is not
fact-dependant, the procedural facts articulated in the Statement
of the Case are sufficient to allow this Court to dispose of
defendants' appeals.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendants' prosecutions for driving while under the
influence of alcohol are not barred by double jeopardy simply
because their driver's licenses were suspended in earlier
administrative proceedings.

The purpose of suspending the

driver's license of someone who has driven while under the
influence of alcohol is "to protect the public, not to punish
individuals drivers."

Ballard v. State Motor Vehicle Division,

595 P.2d 1302, 1305 (Utah 1979).

Because suspending the driving

privileges of an intoxicated driver advances the nonpunitive goal
of protecting the public from a hazardous driver, an
administrative license suspension does not constitute a "criminal
punishment" under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth

3

Amendment,

This Court should therefore affirm the trial court's

denial of defendants' motions to dismiss.
ARGUMENT
This case presents an issue of first impression in
Utah.

Although another case involving a double jeopardy claim in

the context of asset forfeiture proceedings is now pending before
this Court, see State v. Davis, Case No. 940574-CA, this case
implicates another body of case law not involved in the area of
asset forfeiture.

Accordingly, in order to put the issue raised

in its proper historical context, the State has provided a more
extensive discussion of double jeopardy jurisprudence than it
would normally include in a brief to this Court.
POINT I
THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY
JURISPRUDENCE PROM PEARCE TO KURTH RANCH
The Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause provides
as follows: " . . . nor shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life and limb . . .."
U.S. Const. Amend. V.

Over a century ago, the United States

Supreme Court observed that " [i]f there is anything settled in
the jurisprudence of England and America, it is that no man can
be twice lawfully punished for the same offence."
Lanae. 18 Wall. 163, 168 (1874).

Ex parte

The Court has therefore

interpreted the provision to extend three distinct protections to
criminal defendants:
The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against a
second prosecution for the same offense after
acquittal. It protects against a second
4

prosecution for the same offense after
conviction. And it protects against multiple
punishments for the same offense.
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 2076
(1969) .
In this case, only the third prong of Pearce. the
prohibition against multiple punishments for the same offense, is
at issue.

Specifically, defendants allege that they were

punished by the State when the State administratively revoked
their driving privileges for driving while under the influence of
alcohol.

Accordingly, defendants claim that the State cannot

seek to punish them a second time and that the State is therefore
barred from prosecuting them in criminal court for driving under
the influence of alcohol.

In making their argument, defendants

rely primarily on three cases: United States v. Halper, 490 U.S.
435, 109 S. Ct. 1892 (1989); Department of Revenue of Montana v.
Kurth Ranch,
United States,

U.S.
U.S.

, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994); and Austin v.
, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).

As

demonstrated below, defendants have read far too much into Halper
and Kurth Ranch, and their reliance on Austin is wholly misplaced
because that case arises under the Eighth Amendment Excessive
Fines Clause rather than the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy
Clause at issue here.
A.

The Supreme Court Has Nearly Always Held
that Civil Sanctions are Not Punishment
for Double Jeopardy Purposes.

Although multiple criminal prosecutions and multiple
criminal punishments for the same offense are impermissible, the
5

Supreme Court has held that "Congress may impose both a criminal
and a civil sanction in respect to the same act or omission."
United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354,
359, 104 S. Ct. 1099, 1103 (1984) (quoting Helverina v. Mitchell,
303 U.S. 391, 399, 58 S. Ct. 630, 633 (1938)).

Where both the

civil and criminal sanctions are imposed in the same proceeding,
there is no double jeopardy violation.

Halper, 490 U.S. at 450.

Where there are two separate proceedings and one is criminal
while the other is civil, there may be a double jeopardy
violation based on Pearce's prohibition against multiple
punishments if the defendant can demonstrate that the civil
sanction was exacted solely as a punishment.
448-49.

Halper, 490 U.S. at

The standard for establishing that a civil sanction

constitutes punishment for double jeopardy purposes is, however,
very demanding.
Historically, the Supreme Court found that sanctions
arising from civil actions held after completion of a criminal
prosecution did not violate the double jeopardy clause.1 See,
e.g., 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 366 (civil forfeiture obtained
after acquittal on charge of illegal sale of firearms without a
1

The sequential order of the criminal and civil proceedings
does not impact the analysis of whether a defendant has been
subjected to "multiple punishments" for the same offense. See,
e.g., United States v. Tillev. 18 F.3d 295, 298 n.5 (5th Cir.)
("Regardless of the order of the civil and criminal proceedings,
the Double Jeopardy Clause will ban the second sanction if both
the first and the second sanction are deemed punishment."
(citations omitted)), cert, denied,
U.S.
, 115 S. Ct. 574
(1994). Accord United States v. Mavers, 897 F.2d 1126, 1127,
reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 907 F.2d 1145 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied,
U.S.
, 111 S. Ct. 178 (1990).
6

license upheld against double jeopardy challenge); One Lot
Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232,
237, 93 S. Ct. 489, 493 (1972) (civil forfeiture after an
acquittal on smuggling charge upheld); Rex Trailer Co. v. United
States, 350 U.S. 148, 154, 76 S. Ct. 219, 222 (1956) (upholding
civil damages suit filed after conviction of fraud).

In short,

the Supreme Court concluded that "the risk to which the [Double
Jeopardy] Clause refers is not present in proceedings that are
not 'essentially criminal [prosecutions].'" Breed v. Jones, 421
U.S. 519, 528, 95 S. Ct. 1779, 1785 (1975).
The 89 Firearms line of authority applied a two-part
test based primarily on principles of statutory construction to
determine whether a particular civil penalty was so punitive as
to be deemed criminal punishment:
First we have set out to determine whether
Congress, in establishing the penalizing
mechanism, indicated either expressly or
impliedly, a preference for [a civil] label
or [a criminal label]. Second, where
Congress has indicated an intention to
establish a civil penalty, we have inquired
further whether the statutory scheme was so
punitive either in purpose or effect as to
negate that intention.
89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 362-63 (quoting United States v. Ward,
448 U.S. 242, 248, 100 S. Ct. 2636, 2641 (1980) (internal
citations omitted)).

7

In United States v. Halper2, the Court clarified the
significance of its earlier double jeopardy cases:
The relevant teaching of [such cases as
Helverincr. Hess, Rex Trailer and Emerald Cut
Stones! is that the Government is entitled to
rough remedial justice, that is, it may
demand compensation according to somewhat
imprecise formulas, such as reasonable
liquidated damages or a fixed sum plus double
damages, without being deemed to have imposed
a second punishment for the purpose of double
jeopardy analysis. These cases do not tell
us, because the problem was not presented in
them, what the Constitution commands when one
of those imprecise formulas authorizes a
supposedly remedial sanction that does not
remotely approximate the Government's damages
and actual costs, and rough justice becomes
clear injustice.
Haloer, 490 U.S. at 446.
The Halper Court then indicated that "the [statutory]
labels 'criminal' and 'civil' are not of paramount importance."
Id. at 447.

Rather, because the double jeopardy protection

against multiple punishments for the same offense is
"intrinsically personal [, its] violation can be identified only
by assessing the character of the actual sanctions imposed on the
individual by the machinery of the state."

2

Id. (footnote

In Halper, the defendant was the manager of a medical
laboratory that provided services to Medicare patients. Halper
submitted 65 falsified claims for reimbursement that resulted in
his company being overpaid a total of $585. Halper was convicted
of 65 violations of the false-claims act and was fined $5,000 and
sentenced to two years of incarceration. Subsequently, the
government was granted summary judgment against Halper in an
action filed under the civil false-claims act, which mandated the
assessment of a fixed penalty of $2,000 for each of the 65 false
claims filed by Halper for a total of $130,000.
8

omitted).

The Court explained:
This is not to say that whether a sanction
constitutes punishment must be made from the
defendant's perspective. On the contrary,
our cases have acknowledged that for the
defendant even remedial sanctions carry the
sting of punishment. Rather, we hold merely
that in determining whether a particular
civil sanction constitutes criminal
punishment, it is the purpose actually served
by the sanction in question, not the
underlying nature of the proceeding giving
rise to the sanction, that must be evaluated.

Id. at 447 n.7.
Against this backdrop, the Court articulated its test
for determining whether a civil sanction constitutes criminal
punishment for double jeopardy purposes and stated the holding of
Halper as follows:
We therefore hold that under the Double
Jeopardy Clause a defendant who already has
been punished in a criminal prosecution may
not be subjected to an additional civil
sanction to the extent that the second
sanction may not fairly be characterized as
remedial, but only as a deterrent or
retribution.
Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49 (emphasis added).
Despite the clarity of the Court's express holding,
defendants argue that another sentence in the Halper opinion
creates ambiguity about what test for determining whether a civil
sanction constitutes punishment should be applied to their case.
Br. of Appellants at 4-5.

Instead of the test articulated in the

Court's holding, defendants argue the following language is
controlling:
[A] civil sanction that cannot be said solely
to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can
9

only be explained as also serving either
retributive or deterrent purposes, is
punishment, as we have come to understand the
term.
Halper, 490 U.S. at 448.
On their face, the above passages from the Halper
opinion are difficult to reconcile.

However, when viewed in the

context of the Halper case itself, it is clear that the Court did
not intend to hold that the existence of any incidental
retributive or deterrent effect of an otherwise remedial measure
will render that remedial measure punishment for double jeopardy
purposes.

The Double Jeopardy Clause is implicated only in those

rare instances where a purportedly remedial measure becomes so
grossly disproportionate to the harm suffered by the government
as a result of the defendant's conduct that it totally loses its
remedial characteristics and becomes purely punitive.
B.

The Halper Court Made Clear That Its
Holding Was Not Intended To Require
Sweeping Changes In The Way Civil
Sanctions Axe Viewed Under The Double
Jeopardy Clause.

The Halper Court emphasized the limited scope of its
holding and said it was announcing a rule for the "rare case, the
case . . . where a fixed-penalty provision subjects a prolific
but small-gauge offender to a sanction overwhelmingly
disproportionate to the damages he has caused."

Id. at 449.

The Halper rule "is one of reason" that should seldom result in
civil sanctions being deemed punishment.

Id.

As the Halper

Court concluded: "[T]he only proscription established by our
ruling is that the Government may not criminally prosecute a
10

defendant, impose a criminal penalty upon him, and then bring a
separate civil action based on the same conduct and receive a
judgment that is not rationally related to the goal of making the
Government whole."

Id. at 451.

Under Halper, courts must first decide whether the
sanction sought "bears [a] rational relation to the goal of
compensating the Government for its loss."

Id. at 449.

If so,

then the sanction is proper and should not be deemed punishment
for double jeopardy purposes.

However, if a defendant

demonstrates that the sanction "appears

to qualify as

'punishment' in the plain meaning of the word, then the defendant
is entitled to an accounting of the Government's damages and
costs to determine if the penalty sought in fact constitutes a
second punishment."

Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).

In

providing that accounting, the Government need not be exacting
but can instead use "imprecise formulas" to approximate its
damages.

Id.

(emphasizing that its decision "cast no shadow on

[its] time-honored judgments" in which it had accepted such
imprecise formulas as liquidated damages for calculating remedial
sanctions).

Trial courts have "the discretion to determine on

the basis of such an accounting the size of the civil sanction
the Government may receive without crossing the line between
remedy and punishment."

Id. (citations omitted).

Having explained its standard for determining whether a
civil sanction constitutes punishment for double jeopardy
purposes, the Supreme Court noted its agreement "with the
11

District Court['s determination] that the disparity between its
approximation of the Government's cost [($16,000)] and Halper's
$130,000 liability [was] sufficiently disproportionate that the
sanction constitutes a second punishment in violation of double
jeopardy[.]"

Halper 490 U.S. at 452. Nevertheless, the Court

remanded the case so that the Government could have "an
opportunity to present . . . an accounting of its actual costs
arising from Halper's fraud, to seek an adjustment of the
District Court's approximation, and to recover its demonstrated
costs."

Id.
The Halper Court's decision to remand the case makes

clear that civil sanctions having retributive or deterrent
consequences in addition to their primarily remedial functions
are not punishment per se for double jeopardy purposes.

Rather,

monetary remedies that appear punitive must be evaluated on a
case-by-case basis to see if they are in fact punishment or are
instead "rationally related to the goal of making the Government
whole."

Id. at 451 (footnote omitted).

If the sanction bears a

rational relationship to a nonpunitive government objective, or
the government can demonstrate that the amount of the sanctions
is roughly proportional to its damages based on an accounting of
its damages, then any punitive characteristics that incidentally
accompany the sanction will not result in the sanction being
deemed a punishment for double jeopardy purposes.

12

C.

The Supreme Court Recently Recognized
the Continuing Vitality of the Halper
Test for Determining Whether A Civil
Sanction Constitutes Punishment For
Double Jeopardy Purposes.

In its most recent double jeopardy case, Dept. of
Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch,

U.S.

, 114 S. Ct. 1937,

1948 (1994), the Court held that a purported "tax" that is "the
functional equivalent of a successive criminal prosecution" may
not follow a separate criminal punishment.

In reviewing the

Montana tax, the Court first noted that the legislative history
of the tax demonstrated it was intended to deter drug use, Id. at
1946, and that the tax rate was high, Id. at 1947. The Court
made clear, however, that "while a high tax rate and deterrent
purpose lend support to the characterization of the drug tax as
punishment, these features, in and of themselves, d[id] not
necessarily render the tax punitive."

Id. (citation omitted).

That notion squares with the Court's recognition in Halper that
even remedial sanctions carry the sting of punishment, Halper,
490 U.S. at 447 n.7. More importantly, it confirms that civil
sanctions and taxes will not be deemed "punishment" for double
jeopardy purposes simply because they are punitive in part.
The Kurth Ranch majority explained why several other
factors prompted it to conclude that the Montana tax was in fact
not a tax but instead a punishment.

Perhaps most telling was the

Court's observation that liability under the unique Montana drug
stamp tax at issue in Kurth Ranch was statutorily conditioned
upon the commission of a crime.

Id. at 1947.
13

Indeed, liability

did not even arise unless the "taxpayer" was arrested.

Id.

Accordingly, arrestees "constitute[d] the entire class of
taxpayers subject to the Montana tax."

Id.

Finally, the Court

emphasized that the tax was levied on the taxed goods at a time
when the "taxpayer" neither owned nor possessed the goods.
at 1948.

Id.

Considering the totality of the above factors, the

Court concluded that "[t]aken as a whole, [Montana's] drug tax
[wa]s a concoction of anomalies, too far-removed in crucial
respects from a standard tax assessment to escape
characterization as punishment for purposes of Double Jeopardy
analysis."

Id.

While not applying Halper per se, the Court in Kurth
Ranch made clear that the Halper definition of "punishment" for
double jeopardy purposes was still valid.

For instance, the

majority relied on Halper for the proposition that a civil
sanction constitutes punishment for double jeopardy purposes if
"'the sanction may not be fairly characterized as remedial, but
only as a deterrent or retribution.'"

Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at

1945 (quoting Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49).

Similarly, Chief

Justice Rehnquist, writing in dissent, emphasized that the proper
inquiry was whether the tax rate was "so high that it can only be
explained as serving a punitive purpose."

Id. at 1952. While

the majority concluded that the Montana drug stamp tax
proceedings were the "functional equivalent of a successive
prosecution,lf Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that "the Montana
tax has a nonpenal purpose of raising revenue, as well as the
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legitimate purpose of deterring conduct, such that it should be
regarded as a genuine tax[, and not punishment,] for double
jeopardy purposes."

Id.

Justice 0'Conner, likewise said that:

"Our double jeopardy cases make clear that a civil sanction will
be considered punishment to the extent that serves only the
purposes of retribution and deterrence, as opposed to furthering
any nonpunitve objective."
at 448-49).

Id. at 1953 (citing Halper, 490 U.S.

Finally, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas,

argued that the double jeopardy clause prohibits only multiple
prosecutions, not multiple punishments.

Accordingly, Justice

Scalia advocated a return to the pre-Halper "civil" versus
"criminal" proceeding distinction and urged that Halper be
overruled.

IsL at 1955-60.
In sum, the Halper test for determining whether a civil

sanction is remedial or punitive is not altered, but is indeed
revitalized, under Kurth Ranch.

The Court in both cases

recognized that just because a non-criminal sanction is partly
punitive does necessarily mean the sanction constitutes
punishment for double jeopardy purposes.

Accordingly, despite

defendants' attempts to the contrary, Halper's demanding standard
for deeming a civil sanction punishment for double jeopardy
purposes should not be confused with the easily met definition of
punishment for purposes of the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Eighth Amendment that the Court announced in Austin v. United
States.

U.S.

, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).

15

D.

Halper'B Definition of Punishment for
Fifth Amendment Purposes Is More
Stringent Than Austin's Definition of
Punishment for Eighth Amendment
Purposes.

Defendants essentially attempt an end-run around the
express holding of Halper by claiming that under Austin anytime
an otherwise remedial sanction is accompanied by an element of
deterrence or retribution --no matter how slight that punitive
element might be -- the sanction is deemed a punishment per se
for both Eighth and Fifth Amendment purposes. Defendants'
analysis of Halper in light of Austin -- though perhaps appealing
because of its simplicity --is fundamentally flawed and ignores
the more recent double jeopardy case of Kurth Ranch.
The defendant in Austin was convicted of state drug
charges.

The United States then filed an in rem action seeking

forfeiture of Austin's mobile home and body shop, based on his
having retrieved two grams of cocaine from the mobile home and
distributed them to an undercover agent at the body shop.
Although Austin advanced no double jeopardy claim -- presumably
because the two cases were brought by separate sovereigns --he
did argue that the forfeiture violated the Excessive Fines Clause
of the Eighth Amendment.

Both the trial court and the Eighth

Circuit Court of Appeals rejected that claim and held the
Excessive Fines Clause was inapplicable to civil in rem
forfeitures.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that any sanction
that is "at least in part, punishment" is subject to review under
16

the Excessive Fines Clause. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2806.

In so

holding, the Court relied on dicta contained in Halper.
Significantly, however, the Court did not indicate that its
definition of punishment for Eighth Amendment purposes was
applicable to double jeopardy claims. On the contrary, the
Austin Court cited 89 Firearms and Emerald Cut Stones for the
proposition that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to
civil forfeiture proceedings where the forfeiture could properly
be characterized as remedial and implied that Halper's
prohibition of a civil sanction following a criminal punishment
would apply only if the civil sanction may not fairly be
characterized as remedial. Austin, 114 S. Ct. at 2805 n.4.
Austin's assertion that a civil forfeiture is subject
to review under the Eighth Amendment if it is punitive "at least
in part" cannot be squared with Halper's holding that a civil
sanction is punishment for double jeopardy purposes only if it
"the sanction may not be fairly characterized as remedial, but
only as a deterrent or retribution."

Moreover, while the Court

in Halper recognized that defendant will feel the "sting of
punishment" from even "remedial sanctions," Halper. 490 U.S. at
447 n.7, the Austin Court extended no similar latitude in
determining whether to subject an only partly punitive civil
sanction to Eighth Amendment review.
While making much of the fact that the Court in Austin
borrowed dicta from Halper to articulate a definition of
punishment for Eighth Amendment purposes, defendants fail to
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recognize that the Court has never borrowed language from Austin
to define "punishment" for Fifth Amendment purposes.

Quite the

contrary, in Kurth Ranch (the Court's only double jeopardy case
to be decided after both Halper and Austin) the majority cited
Austin only once.

Even then, the Court merely cited Austin for

the unremarkable proposition that a civil forfeiture may violate
the Eighth Amendment's proscription against excessive fines.
Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1945. Writing in dissent, Justice
Scalia cited Austin in a similar fashion.

Id. at 1958 n.2.

If the Supreme Court really intended the Austin
definition of punishment under the Excessive Fines Clause to be
applicable in double jeopardy cases as defendants suggest, Austin
would have figured more prominently in Kurth Ranch.

Instead, as

discussed above, the Court repeatedly used language similar that
contained in its holding in Halper rather than the Halper dicta
upon which Austin was based.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals recently rejected
attempts by two DUI defendants to rely on Austin as the basis for
their double jeopardy claims for precisely the reasons advanced
by the State above:
The defendants in these appeals argue
that civil sanction is "punishment" under
Halper unless it can "fairly be said to
solely serve a remedial purpose." But this
statement is not the explicit holding of
Halper. . . . Moreover, this "solely
remedial" language is derived from a broader
analysis of the civil-criminal distinction
for purposes of due process. That analysis
does not apply in determining whether a civil
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sanction is "punishment."
The defendants argue that the Supreme
Court in Austin v. United States pointed to
the "solely remedial" language as the holding
of Halper. But Austin involves the Excessive
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, not the
Double Jeopardy Clause. In a more recent
opinion that does involve double jeopardy,
fKurth Ranch,1 the Court has referred to the
explicit Halper holding . . . as the holding
of that case.
State v. Hanson, 532 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Minn. App. 1995) (citations
omitted).
When viewed in context, the passage from Halper upon
which defendants predicate their claim is out-of-sync with Halper
itself as well as the remaining body of double jeopardy
jurisprudence.

Given that the Halper Court stated that its rule

was one of "reason" that should result in civil monetary
sanctions being deemed punishments in only "rare" case,
defendants' expansive interpretation of Halper based on the
Austin Eighth Amendment "excessive fines" standard is unfounded.
Rather, as demonstrated below, numerous appellate courts have
rejected double jeopardy claims similar to that advanced by
defendants based on their determination that Halper was intended
to be read very narrowly.

Indeed, many have held that Halper and

its progeny apply only to monetary sanctions and that nonmonetary sanctions, such a license revocations, are beyond the
reach of the Halper test.
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POINT II
THE RULE ANNOUNCED IN HALPER APPLIES ONLY TO
MONETARY CIVIL SANCTIONS AND WAS NEVER
INTENDED TO INVALIDATE NON-MONETARY SANCTIONS
THAT ADVANCE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVES
When examining double jeopardy claims involving nonmonetary sanctions, several courts have refused to apply Halper's
"particularized assessment" test in favor of looking to Halper
for only general guidance.

See, e.g.. Loui v. Board of Medical

Examiners, 889 P.2d 705, 711 (Hawaii 1995) (Halper test does not
apply to question of whether suspension of physician's license
following his conviction of sexual abuse and kidnapping
constituted a second punishment but looking "more broadly at the
principles enunciated in Halper" to reject double jeopardy
claim); Manocchio v. Kusserow, 961 F.2d 1539, 1542 (11th Cir.
1992) (Halper inapplicable to physician's claim that five year
suspension from participation in Medicare programs constituted a
punishment because it did not involve the assessment of a
monetary sanction and finding suspension was remedial measure to
protect program); United States v. Reed. 937 F.2d 575, 577 (11th
Cir. 1991) ("Halper test simply does not apply" to issue of
whether 30-day disciplinary suspension of letter carrier
constituted a punishment that would bar subsequent prosecution
for conduct underlying suspension but Halper was nonetheless
helpful for "framing [the court's] analysis"); Greene v.
Sullivan, 731 F.Supp. 838, 840 (E.D.Tenn. 1990) (Halper
inapplicable because the government was not seeking any monetary
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recovery from defendant but only seeking to bar him from
participating in Medicaid programs).
Similarly, Halper is not directly applicable to the
question of whether an administrative license revocation
constitutes punishment for double jeopardy purposes.

Because

revoking a person's driver's license in no way compensates the
government for the damage caused by the inebriated driver, some
courts have looked beyond the narrow holding of Halper to resolve
double jeopardy claims similar to those advanced by defendants.
See, e.g.. State v. Hicra. 897 P.2d 928, 933 (Hawaii 1995)
(holding Halper test inapplicable because driver's license
suspension did compensate government for monetary loss, but
applying "broader principles enunciated in Halper" to find
license suspension was a remedial measure designed to protect the
public from unsafe drivers).

Accord Ellis v. Pierce, 282

Cal.Rprt. 93, 95 (Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1991); Freeman v. State, 611
So.2d 1260, 1261 (Fla. App. 2 Dist. 1992) (per curiam).
Other courts have emphasized that permission to drive
on the public roads is a privilege voluntarily granted by the
government and that revocation of a driver's license is therefore
not a punishment.
1993).
,

Johnson v. State. 622 A.2d 199, 205 (Md. App.

Cf^ Helverina v. Mitchell. 303 U.S. 391, 398,

S. Ct.

(1938) (revocation of a privilege voluntarily granted

"is characteristically free of the punitive criminal element"
necessary to deem such action a punishment for double jeopardy
purposes).
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In keeping with the cases cited, this Court should
reject defendants' double jeopardy claims on the ground that the
privilege of having a driver's license is one that is voluntarily
granted by the State and that revocation of that privilege in the
interest of public safety is therefore a remedial measure.

The

mere fact that defendants may incidentally be inconvenienced by
that action, or even feel the "sting of punishment," does not
mean that they have been subjected to a criminal punishment as
envisioned by the Supreme Court in Halper.

Such suspensions are

reasonable measures designed to protect the public safety by
quickly removing dangerous drivers from the public highways.
Indeed, everything about the driver's license scheme is aimed at
ensuring that only those people who can safely drive a vehicle
are permitted to carry a driver's license.3
POINT III
EVEN APPLYING A HALPER ANALYSIS, THE
ADMINISTRATIVE SUSPENSION OR REVOCATION OF A
DRIVER'S LICENSE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE
PUNISHMENT FOR DOUBLE JEOPARDY PURPOSES
The United States Supreme Court's double jeopardy cases
dealing with the question of whether civil sanctions constitute
3

For instance, Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-206 (1994) requires
that the driver's license division test each applicant's:
1) eyesight, 2) ability to read and understand highway signs,
3) physical and mental abilities and 4) ability to exercise
ordinary and responsible control driving a motor vehicleUnder
Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-208 (1994), the division may impose safety
restrictions on a licensee (i.e., requiring a licensee with
vision problems to wear eyeglasses while driving). Revoking a
license of someone who has engaged in such hazardous driving
behavior as driving while under the influence of alcohol is but
another reasonable means of protecting the public from unsafe
drivers.
22

criminal punishment, including Halper and Kurth Ranch, all share
a common theme.

Civil sanctions and taxes will not be deemed

punishment for double jeopardy purposes unless "the clearest
proof" demonstrates that they have lost their remedial or
revenue-generating characteristics and become solely punitive in
"purpose and effect."

89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 365.

Similarly,

an administrative license revocation should not be considered
punishment for double jeopardy purposes unless the clearest proof
demonstrates that administrative license revocations have lost
their safety regulating characteristics and become solely
punitive in both purpose and effect. As demonstrated below,
numerous courts have relied on Halper to determine that the nonmonetary sanction of revoking or suspending a person's driving
privileges does not constitute punishment for double jeopardy
purposes.
A.

Under Halper, A Civil Sanction May
Carry The "Sting of Punishment"
Without Being Deemed A Criminal
Punishment For Double Jeopardy
Purposes.

Even if license revocations were construed as a "civil
remedy" within the meaning of Halper, it is clear that revoking
the driving privileges of people who have revealed their
propensity to drive while under the influence of alcohol is a
remedial measure intended to protect the public from hazardous
drivers.
In 1983, the Utah Legislature revamped Utah's DUI and
license suspension laws.

In so doing, the Legislature passed
23

Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-222 (1994) to make clear that its purpose
in requiring license suspensions for apparent violations of
section 41-6-44 was not to exact a punishment from the driver,
but rather to protect public safety:
The Legislature finds that a primary
purpose of this title relating to suspension
or revocation of a person's license or
privilege to drive a motor vehicle for
driving with a blood alcohol content above a
certain level or while under the influence of
alcohol, any drug, or a combination of
alcohol and any drug, or for refusing to take
a chemical test as provided in Section 41-644.10, is protecting persons on the highways
by quickly removing from the highways those
persons 4who have shown they are safety
hazards.
That the Legislature's intent in requiring suspensions
a person's driving privileges for violations of section 41-6-44
was to protect the public safety is bolstered by the fact that
the Legislature prohibited the Division of Driver's Licenses from
reinstating the suspended license following a driver's DUI
4

Defendants make much of the phrase lfa primary purpose"
and suggest that the legislature implicitly acknowledged that it
had other "primary purposes" for permitting administrative
license revocations. Although defendants indicate that their
review of the legislative history of section 53-3-222 revealed no
insight into what those other purposes may have been, they
proceed as though the legislative history indicates that the
legislature had punitive purposes in mind. While that may be
true with respect to individual legislators, the fact remains
that only one purpose -- the desire to protect the public from
unsafe drivers -- garnered enough support to merit codification.
Moreover, during the 1995 legislative term, the
legislature amended section 53-3-222 to make clear that the sole
purpose of administrative license suspensions for driving while
under the influence of alcohol was to promote swift action in the
interest of protecting the public safety. Specifically, the
legislature substituted the words "the purpose" for its earlier
language of Ma primary purpose." Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-222
(Supp. 1995).
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conviction until the driver completes statutorily prescribed
alcohol and drug dependency assessments, education, treatment and
rehabilitation.

See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(8) (b) (i) (1994) .

Indeed, the Legislature has even prohibited license reinstatement
for drivers convicted of three violations within a six year
period unless a licensed alcohol or drug dependency facility
certifies that they no longer use alcohol or drugs in an abusive
or illegal manner.
(1994).
only

See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(8)(b)(iii)

If deterrence and retribution were the Legislature's

purpose for requiring suspension of driving privileges for

violations of section 41-6-44, it would not have enacted such
elaborate safeguards to ensure that those privileges were not
reinstated until after convicted DUI offenders had taken
significant steps to show that they were no longer a threat to
the public safety.
Even before the enactment of section 53-3-222, the Utah
Supreme Court recognized that the purpose of suspending a
person's driving privileges for violations of section 41-6-44 was
protection of public safety:
The purpose of this administrative
[license revocation] procedure is not to
punish the inebriated drivers; such persons
are subject to separate criminal prosecution
for the purpose of punishment. The
administrative revocation proceedings are to
protect the public, not to punish individual
drivers.
Ballard, 595 P.2d at 1305. Accord Citv of Orem v. Crandall. 760
P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1988) (post-Halper case rejecting claim
that administrative license suspension hearing was a criminal
25

proceeding that barred subsequent criminal prosecution for DUI).
See also Barnes v. Tofanv. 261 N.E.2d 617, 620 (N.Y. Ct. App.
1970) ("the suspension or revocation of the privilege of
operating a motor vehicle is essentially civil in nature, having
as its aims chastening of the errant motorist, and, more
importantly, the protection of the public from such a dangerous
individual"); People v. Esposito, 521 N.E.2d 873, 879-82 (111.
1988); Ruae v. Kovach, 467 N.E.2d 673, 678-81 (Ind. 1984); Heddan
v. Dirkswaaer, 336 N.W.2d 54, 59-63 (Minn. 1983) (all holding
that due process is not offended by summary suspension of
driver's license because state has important interest in keeping
its highways safe by removing drunken drivers from its roads).
Defendants suggest that Ballard is no longer valid
becauseffalpereliminated the distinction between civil and
criminal proceedings for double jeopardy purposes.
is flawed for two reasons.

That argument

First, the Court in Halper did not

eliminate that distinction; the Court merely held, as it had
implied in its earlier cases, that the distinction was not
"paramount" because civil penalties that are not "rationally
related to the goal of making the Government whole" can become
punitive.

Halper, 490 U.S. at 447, 451. More importantly,

Ballard satisfies the Halper criteria.

Specifically, the Ballard

Court found that the purpose of license revocations is to protect
the public safety and not to punish the driver.

Nothing in

Halper, Kurth Ranch or even Austin calls for a reconsideration of
that finding.

Until the Utah Supreme Court overturns Ballard,
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all lower courts in Utah are bound by the Ballard Court's
determination that the purpose of administrative drivers' license
revocations for DUI and related offenses is to protect the public
safety.

See generally State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393, 398-99

(Utah 1994) (discussing importance of stare decisis and heavy
burden that must be met before overturning precedent).
Accordingly, this Court need look no further than Ballard to
affirm the trial court's denial of defendants' motions to
dismiss.
Even if this Court were inclined to revisit the issue
of whether administrative license suspensions constitute
punishment for double jeopardy purposes, it should follow the
majority and better reasoned view and hold that they do not.
In the years between Halper and Kurth Ranch every
appellate court that addressed double jeopardy issues akin to
that raised by defendants rejected those arguments.

See, e.g.,

State v. Murray, 644 So.2d 533, 535 (Fla. App. 4 Dist. 1994)
("Because the primary purpose of [suspending a driver's license
for DUI] is to provide an administrative remedy for public
protection, and not to punish the offender, a double jeopardy
prohibition does not arise."); Johnson v. State. 622 A.2d 199,
204-06 (Md.App. 1993) (purpose of suspension is to protect public
safety and deter drunk driver; punitive effect was incidental and
did not elevate suspension to level of punishment required under
Halper); Butler v. Deot. of Public Safety & Corrections. 609
So.2d 790, 795-97 (La. 1992) (while license suspension statute
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"is to some extent deterrent and thus of a punitive nature . . .
[its] primary effect is remedial; it removes those drivers from
our state highways who have proven to be reckless or hazardous .
. . [and therefore does not] amount to a second punishment for
the same offense11); Vermont v. Strong, 605 A.2d 510, 513 (Vt.
1992) (summary license suspension is not punishment under Halper
because it "serves the rational remedial purpose of protecting
public safety by quickly removing potentially dangerous drivers
from the roads"); State v. Nichols, 819 P.2d 995, 1000 (Ariz.
App. 1991) (while license suspension "may be punitive from the
viewpoint of the license holder . . . its purpose is to remove
from our highway drivers who are a danger to the public").
The double jeopardy analysis provided by the Vermont
Supreme Court in Strong is typical of the cases cited above.

In

Strong, the court explained the purpose of its license suspension
statute:
The summary suspension scheme serves the
rational remedial purpose of protecting
public safety by quickly removing potentially
dangerous drivers from the roads. License
reinstatement requirements reinforce this
purpose. Suspended licenses are reinstated
only after operators have met screening and
treatment requirements designed to identify
unsafe drivers and to help them to the point
where they no longer pose the same risk. The
minimum suspension period is not excessive in
relation to the remedial purpose, and we must
defer to the Legislature in determining the
remedial action necessary to achieve its
goals.
Strong, 605 A.2d at 513 (citations omitted).
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Having identified the remedial purpose of the Vermont
suspension scheme, the Strong Court acknowledged and then
rejected the defendant's claim that Halper had fundamentally
altered double jeopardy analysis:
Our reading of Halper is more narrow
than that of defendant. The Halper Court
pointed out that its holding that a
particular civil penalty was punitive "is a
rule for the rare case." [490 U.S.] at 449,
109 S.Ct. at 1902. The rule requires finding
that the civil sanction may fairly be
characterized "only as a deterrent or
retribution." Id. (emphasis added). [T]he
fact that a statute designed primarily to
serve remedial purposes incidently serves the
purpose of punishment as well does not mean
that the statute results in punishment for
double jeopardy purposes.
Strong, 605 A.2d at 514 (some quotation marks and citations
omitted).
Finally, the Strong Court emphasized that other courts
had uniformly rejected similar double jeopardy claims:
We note that no court has held that the
suspension of a motor vehicle operator's
license is so punitive as to involve a
criminal punishment for double jeopardy
purposes. The decisions prior to Halper held
that license suspension is not a criminal
punishment invoking double jeopardy
protection. The few decisions since Halper
hold similarly. In short, a "bright line"
has developed because the nonpunitive purpose
of the license suspension is so clear and
compelling. We see nothing in Halper that
induces us to cross that line.
Id. (citations omitted).
Strong could well have been written in response to
defendant's motion in this case. As discussed above, Utah's
license suspension scheme, like Vermont's, is driven by the
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desire to protect public safety and includes elaborate safeguards
to ensure that driving privileges are not reinstated until the
offender no longer poses a risk to society.

While individual

driver's may feel the "sting of punishment" when their driving
privileges are revoked, that sting is merely incidental to the
advancement of compelling public safety considerations.
Accordingly, under Halper, driver's license suspensions and
revocations cannot be deemed punishment for double jeopardy
purposes because "administrative revocation proceedings are
[designed] to protect the public, not to punish individual
drivers."

Ballard, 595 P.2d at 1305.
In the year since Kurth Ranch was decided, DUI

defendants across the country have, with renewed vigor, argued
that their criminal prosecutions were barred because they had
already been punished by having their driver's licenses revoked
in administrative hearings. As defendants properly note, those
arguments met with occasional success in trial courts. Br. of
Appellants at 10-11.

Defendants fail to acknowledge, however,

that such claims have been almost universally rejected by
appellate courts -- even in light of Austin and Kurth Ranch.
See, e.g., State v. Savard & Greelev. 659 A.2d 1265, 1266-68 (Me.
1995); State v. Young. 530 N.W.2d 269, 277-78 (Neb. App. 1995);
State v. Murray. 644 So.2d 533, 535 (Fla. App. 4 Dist. 1994);
Hanson. 532 N.W.2d 598, 600-02; Higa. 897 P.2d at 932-934 (all
post-Kurth Ranch cases holding that administrative driver's

30

license revocations are non-punitive remedial measures designed
to protect the public safety).5
This Court should follow the majority, and more
thoughtfully reasoned view, and hold that an administrative
license revocation does not constitute a criminal punishment
under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment,

To do

otherwise would be to adopt an interpretation of Halper that
would have no bounds even though the Supreme Court made clear
that its rule was one of reason that should result in civil
sanctions being deemed punishments in only "rare" cases.
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
AND PUBLISHED OPINION
The State respectfully asks that this Court set this
case for oral argument and render its decision in a published
opinion.

Given the vastly different interpretations of the

central cases provided by the parties, the State believes oral
argument will materially assist this Court in its deliberations.
Motions to dismiss based on double jeopardy claims
similar to those advanced by defendants have become virtually a
matter of routine in DUI cases throughout Utah.

Further

proceedings in literally dozens of cases throughout the state

5

Only one panel of the Ohio Court of Appeals has held that
administrative license revocations for driving while under the
influence of alcohol constitutes a punishment for double jeopardy
purposes- See State v. Gustafson. 1995 WL 387619 (Ohio App. 7th
Dist.). However, another panel of the Ohio Court of Appeals has
rejected that claim, State v. Miller. 1995 WL 275770 (Ohio App.
3d Dist.), as have other lower courts in Ohio, State v.
Ackrouche, 650 N.E.2d 535, 537-39 (Ohio Mun. 1995); Citv of
Cleveland v. Nutter, 646 N.E.2d 1209, 1210-12 (Ohio Mun. 1995).
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have been stayed pending resolution of these appeals.

Issuance

of a published opinion is therefore desirable because this is a
case of first impression in Utah that will have widespread
application.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should
affirm the trial court's denials of defendants' motions to
dismiss and remand the cases for trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this '?&/— day of August, 1995,
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General
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Orders Denying Defendants' Motions to Dismiss
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STATE OF UTAH
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MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff,

Case No.

vs
FLORENCE
AND
HUTCHISON

BRET RAY ARBON,

Judge

^jT^/TC

£££

Defendant.
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